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 1. Introduction 
 
Theoretical and empirical approaches have stressed the existence of financial constraints in 
the innovative activities of firms. However, only a scarce amount of empirical evidence has 
analysed the effect of financial constraints on the probability of abandoning an innovation 
project. Our data shows that a 23.3% of Spanish potential innovators abandon an 
innovation project and that 37.7% of firms state to face medium-high financial constraints.  
Innovation projects show different characteristics in comparison with other projects. In 
particular, innovative firms encounter higher external financial difficulties to be able to 
invest in new R&D projects, because their specific features increase risk and reinforce the 
informational problems with external investors (Hall, 2002). Hence, due to specific features 
of innovation in terms of risk and informational asymmetries, innovative firms usually find 
persistent barriers for accessing external financial support. Surprisingly, empirical evidence 
has usually focused on the determinants of innovation and the characteristics of innovative 
firms, while the failure of innovation projects has received very little attention. 
 
Literature stands out access to financing as being the one crucial determinant for 
innovative firms (D’Este et al., 2012; Hölzl and Janger, 2012; Segarra et al., 2008). Among 
the different types of constraints, financial constraints are highly important due to the 
possible macroeconomic consequences. In particular, where financial constraints affect 
innovating firms more intensely, this may cause a decrease in the new knowledge required 
for economic development. This may potentially inhibit economic growth. For instance, 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) indicate that firms in high-tech sectors may have been 
under-investing due to financial constraints. Furthermore, financial constraints are crucial 
in that they may lead to the reinforcement of other innovation barriers. As a consequence, 
it is by no means a negligible question to analyse financial barriers on innovation projects.  
 
In accordance with previous findings, Spain represents an interesting country in which to 
analyse the effect of financial barriers (Hölzl and Janger, 2012). Hence, this paper analyses 
the role of financial constraints on the likelihood of Spanish firms abandoning an 
innovation project during the period 2004-2010. In line with previous studies (D’Este et al., 
2012; Mohnen et al., 2008; Savignac, 2008), we exclude those firms which are non-
innovation active and did not experience any barriers. This is done in order to correct the 
bias problems for a sample selection that can appear when asking all surveyed firms about 
barriers to innovation. We call ‘potential innovative firms’ those firms who engaged in 
innovation activities or did not do so due to one or more obstacles.  
 
Our panel data offers an extensive sample of Spanish firms from some waves of 
Community Innovation Survey. After the dataset treatment, our sample contains 4,882 
potential innovative firms of which 3,779 firms belong to the manufacturing sector and 
1,043 firms to the service sector. From the total number of potential innovators, 335 firms 
did not innovate but felt barriers against them engaging in innovation activities, while 4,487 
firms innovated successfully during the analysed period. The empirical treatment applied is 
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 a recursive biprobit model to take into account financial constraints simultaneously with 
the decision to abandon an innovation project. The empirical model measures the 
probability that an innovative firm abandons an innovation project due to the existence of 
financial barriers: lack of funds within the firm or group and lack of finance from sources 
outside the firm1. Our results show that financial constraints have more effect on the 
probability of abandoning an innovation project during the concept stage. Also, low-
technological industries and non-KIS service industries show more sensitivity to financial 
constraints.  
 
This article makes several contributions. First, the access to sources of finance may restrict 
the capacity of potential innovative firms to carry out innovation projects. However, 
empirical literature is not as conclusive as one might expect concerning the existence of 
significant financial constraints2. We contribute to this line of empirical literature by 
differentiating the effect of internal and external financial barriers on the probability of 
abandoning a project. Second, we consider that the financial sources may have different 
effects depending on the stage of the innovation projects. Third, research on capital market 
imperfections has not focused on particular sectors of the economy (see, Carpenter and 
Petersen 2002, p. 55). In particular, empirical literature has devoted scarce interest to the 
link between financial constraints and innovation performance at the sectoral level. We 
contribute to covering this gap partially by analysing four industrial classifications (high and 
low tech manufacturing industries, KIS and non-KIS services). Hence, we examine if 
financial constraints affect the probability of abandoning the innovation project 
prematurely or once it has started3. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the literature related 
to financial constraints to innovation. Section 3 presents our main hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the database and main statistics. The next section presents the econometric 
methodology. Section 6 shows our main empirical results. Finally, Section 7 presents the 
main conclusions. 
 
                                                 
1 Here, we decided not to include the barriers related to the excessive costs of innovation projects while we 
focus on financial obstacles.  
2 Some articles have strongly criticized the positive correlation between R&D and internal financial sources, 
in particular cash-flow, since it may also reflect that innovative firms anticipate high future profits that lead 
them to invest strongly (Savignac, 2008). The presence of financial constraints for innovative firms is 
frequently investigated via the sensitivity of R&D investment to financial factors (Himmelberg and Petersen, 
1994; Harhoff, 1998; Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse, 2001; Tiwari et al., 2007). During recent years, a new line of 
research has focused on the analysis of the impact of financial constraints on R&D risk projects. 
3 CIS include as innovation activities the acquisition of machinery, equipment, software, and licenses; 
engineering and development work, training, marketing and R&D when they are specifically undertaken to 
develop and/or implement a product or process innovation.  
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2. Innovation projects and financial constraints 
 
Financial constraints of innovation projects are linked with the nature of knowledge (Hall 
and Lerner, 2009). Innovation shows a heterogeneous, asymmetrical and accumulative 
nature (Benedetti, 2009). First, innovation activities are heterogeneous in the sense that 
some firms do not innovate, some concentrate on specific types of innovation –product, 
process, organization or marketing– while others carry out various types of innovation. 
Second, innovation strategies are asymmetric; that is, the distribution of innovation and its 
impact on a firm's productivity and growth is asymmetric, with its distribution being more 
skewed towards the right. Third, innovations are accumulative since innovation increases 
when a firm has already introduced other innovations. Additionally, innovation projects 
present a high degree of uncertainty, in particular at the beginning of research programmes. 
This considerable uncertainty and risk reduces the capacity of innovative firms to find 
external sources of finance and, as an alternative, they have to generate internal funds.  
 
In essence, innovative firms encounter financial obstacles for investment in innovative 
activities through the presence of externalities, problems of informational asymmetries and 
problems of appropriability with the return on R&D investment (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 
1962). Consequently, innovative firms experience high costs for R&D investments and 
induce underinvestment in innovation activities. Obstacles associated with asymmetric 
information or moral hazard problems can derive from a gap between external and internal 
costs that lead to R&D underinvestment or liquidity constraints.  
 
From the point of view of financial markets, these may under-invest in innovation projects 
due to different reasons. Hence, financial barriers to innovation projects are closely related 
to some of their inherent characteristics (Hall, 2002) such as the low return expectation due 
to an inability to secure profits from an innovation, the higher cost of innovation projects, 
the high sunk costs, the specific dimension of the physical capital, the presence of 
externalities and free-riders, among others. All these characteristics reduce the capacity of 
financial institutions and financial markets to increase sources to firms’ innovation projects. 
 
Some innovation projects may not be started, have to be delayed or are abandoned because 
of lack of access to financial resources. Some of the factors that may increase barriers to 
external funds are the risk of bankruptcy and the low value of intangibles in case of 
liquidation. The empirical analysis remarks how financial barriers restrict the capacity of 
innovative firms to carry out innovation projects (“hampering barriers”), and how financial 
constraints reduce the capacity of potential innovative firms to become innovative firms 
(“deterring barriers”).  
 
Hence, financial constraints for innovation are an important constraint impeding firms 
from catching up and developing innovations to reduce the gap between themselves and 
the technological frontier.  
4
  
2.1. Empirical evidence  
 
Since Fazzari et al. (1988) an increasing number of econometric studies have tried to 
observe the existence of financial constraints by analysing the sensitivity of investment to 
changes in available financial resources. In those works, the presence of financial 
restrictions is derived in an indirect way, given that when a firm’s R&D investment is 
sensitive to cash flow, this is reflected indirectly by the firm’s lack of access to the credit 
market. 
 
During recent years, the access to new datasets on external financial sources facilitates 
applying direct methods to observe the presence of financial restrictions at firm level 
(Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2009; Piga and Atzeni 2007). In addition, the 
increased free access to datasets from some countries with harmonized surveys on 
innovation activities at firm level has facilitated the identification of potentially financially 
constrained firms (Canepa and Stoneman, 2002; Savignac, 2008).  
 
A strand of empirical literature remarks on the existence of financial constraints as a 
significant determinant for abandoning a project. For instance, Mohnen et al. (2008) 
analyse the impact of financial constraints on hampering innovation using the Dutch CIS 
survey. Specifically, those authors analyse four different situations: abandoning, 
prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down, or not starting a project. According to their 
results, financial constraints “have a significant and positive impact on the three 
probabilities of prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down and not starting a project, 
but not on that of abandoning a project”. Similarly, for a sample of French firms, Savignac 
(2008) finds the probability of innovating diminishes due to the existence of financial 
barriers. In fact, this author finds that barriers exert a negative effect among non-innovative 
firms that try to innovate. More recently, Garcia-Vega and Lopez (2010) analyse a sample 
of more than 8,300 innovative Spanish firms for the period 2005-2007. Their results show 
the importance of the lack of funds on the probability of abandoning innovation projects. 
In particular, large firms are much more affected since they invest in innovation projects 
that involve a larger amount of funds.  
 
In spite of this evidence, another strand of empirical literature finds some mixed results. 
For instance, Galia and Legros (2004) show that financial constraints are not among the 
main obstacles to innovation (their database is composed of firms with 20 or more 
employees from French CIS2). Also Hölzl and Janger (2012) show ambiguous results with 
respect to the effect of financial barriers on the probability of hampering and deterring an 
innovation project. For a sample of firms from 18 countries and using CIS4 and CIS 2006, 
Hölzl and Janger (2012) highlight the differences between country groups. According to 
their results, in Southern European countries and emerging countries, R&D and non-
technological innovators are most hampered by financial barriers. However, they exert a 
less important effect on countries at the cutting edge of technology. Finally, using CIS 2 
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 data for European countries, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) show ambiguous results for UK 
CIS. While they can accept for CIS 2 that high-tech firms are more financially constrained 
than low-tech firms, for CIS 3 the test statistics reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Furthermore, some studies have highlighted the existence of higher financial barriers for 
firms in high-tech industries. Firms operating in technologically intensive sectors face 
higher risks since they usually have to invest in innovations which are less likely to have 
been undertaken elsewhere. As a consequence, they are going to suffer from higher 
information asymmetries (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Revest and Sapio, 2012)4. 
According to Guiso (1998, p. 40), higher financial barriers are due to the more severe 
informational frictions which affect high-tech firms5.  
 
Hence, our aim is that after applying controls through traditional factors such as size, age, 
group membership and the technological intensity of the sector, we observe how financial 
constraints affect to the risk of failure of innovation projects. 
 
 
3. Main hypotheses   
 
As we have seen previously, economic theory and empirical evidence have stressed the 
existence of financial constraints in R&D and innovation activities (Hall, 2002; Canepa and 
Stoneman, 2008). Recent empirical analyses have shown that financial obstacles negatively 
affect the propensity of firms to innovate (Savignac, 2008; Blanchard et al., 2012).  
 
In this paper we focus on the impact of financial obstacles in the failure of innovation 
projects. Although the conceptualization of failures of innovation projects has received less 
attention in literature and specific evidence on their determinants is scarce, empirical 
findings tend to point out that facing financial barriers increases the likelihood of failure of 
innovation projects (Mohnen et al., 2008). Financial obstacles may be internal, when firms’ 
own resources are insufficient to develop innovation projects, or external when there is a 
lack of access to external funding, either public or private. Based on the literature on 
financial constraints and innovation, our first hypothesis is that firms that state they face 
lack of funds will be more likely to have innovation projects that fail. 
 
                                                 
4 According to Carpenter and Petersen (2002, p.54), “there are three reasons why high-tech investment is particularly 
likely to be affected by capital market imperfections. First, the returns to high-tech investment are skewed and highly uncertain, in 
part because R&D projects have a low probability of financial success. Second, substantial information asymmetries are likely to 
exist between firms and potential investors. Because high-tech investments are difficult to evaluate and frequently embody new 
knowledge, insiders will have much better information than outsiders about the prospects of the firm's investments. […] Third, 
high-tech investments often have limited collateral value R&D investment, which is predominantly salary payments, has little 
salvage value in the event of failure. Furthermore, physical investments designed to embody R&D results are likely to be firm 
specific and therefore have little collateral value.” 
5 This is due to the fact that innovation projects are much less well understood by outside observers, since 
past experience or observed past realisations can offer little guidance in assessing the prospects of truly new 
projects; rather it is likely that the entrepreneur undertaking the innovation project has, if not more 
knowledge, at least a better perception of its likelihood of success. 
6
 Departing from this main hypothesis, two sources of heterogeneity may exist in the effects 
that financial obstacles have on the probability of abandoning an innovation project. First, 
the effects may be different depending on the stage of the lifecycle of the innovation 
project. Second, facing internal or external barriers may affect the likelihood that an 
innovation project fails with a different degree or intensity.  
 
Firstly, failure is inherent to innovation projects and there are different stages where firms 
may consider it convenient to abandon a project. The information available in the PITEC 
allows for two stages to be distinguished, to abandon during the conceptual phase or once 
the project has started.  
 
Theoretical literature does not provide a clear prediction whether there are differences on 
the effects of financial obstacles on the probability that a firm abandons a project at one 
specific stage. Nevertheless, the characteristics of R&D and innovation projects suggest the 
existence of possible differences. Firstly, R&D projects are characterised by the existence 
of high sunk and fixed costs. Therefore, once firms have decided to begin an innovation 
project it is less likely that they abandon it because of financial obstacles. Secondly, the 
asymmetric information problem that affects obtaining external funds is more relevant in 
the concept stage when it is more difficult to give indications of the quality of the 
innovation project. Once the project has started, the returns are less uncertain and to 
obtain external funds will probably require a lower risk premium than in the concept stage. 
Thirdly, firms mostly apply for public subsidies for their R&D projects in the concept stage 
and, in the case of it not being granted, may cause the abandonment of the project. Finally, 
some empirical analyses have pointed out that financial constraints have a significant and 
positive impact on the probability of stopping prematurely, seriously slowing down and not 
starting a project, but not on the probability of abandoning a project (Mohnen et al., 2008). 
Departing from these arguments, our hypothesis is that financial obstacles will impact on 
the likelihood of abandoning a project in the concept stage but not once the project has 
started. 
 
Although facing financial barriers, external or internal, should increase the probability of 
abandoning an innovation project, the effects of both types of financial barriers on the 
likelihood of abandoning an innovation project may be different. In a model of firm-level 
investment in R&D it is assumed that a firm faces a marginal cost of capital schedule with 
an upward slope (David et al., 2000). This upward slope shows that when the volume of 
R&D increases the firm will have to move from financing projects with internal funds to 
resort to external sources where the cost of capital is higher. The literature on the financing 
of R&D shows that the source of financing matters because of the specific characteristics 
of R&D investment, the existence of information asymmetries and other imperfections in 
capital markets.  
 
This literature has also pointed out that the degree of credit constraints also depends on the 
characteristics of firms and R&D projects and they affect high-tech sectors in particular 
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 (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008). All these arguments suggest that to face external barriers 
may have greater effects on the decision not to start or to abandon a project than the lack 
of internal funds and that these effects are probably greater for riskier projects. In addition, 
one of the sources of external funds is public subsidies that have their own criteria to select 
approved projects and currently they finance high impact and risky projects that the firms 
themselves would not have financed on their own (Takalo et al., 2012). Therefore, our 
hypothesis is that the lack of access to external funding will be more positively associated 
with the likelihood of abandoning an innovation project than when the main limitation is 
the lack of funds within the firm or the group. 
 
 
4. Database  
 
4.1. The database  
 
The data used is from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel (henceforth, PITEC). 
PITEC is the result of the collaboration between the Spanish National Statistics Institute 
and COTEC foundation with the aim of providing data from the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS). The main advantage of CIS data is that it contains detailed information on 
innovation behaviour at firm level. However, CIS data has several constraints. First, it does 
not offer information on firms’ balance sheets, which would allow us to assess the effect of 
internal or external finance on the behaviour of R&D investment. Second, financial 
constraints and the innovation pattern at firm level present a dynamic nature where time 
may be a relevant dimension. However, CIS dataset offers a cross section. Spanish PITEC 
overcomes this drawback by offering panel data. This panel data covers the period 2004-
2010.  
 
Our dataset provides exhaustive information for a sample of Spanish firms over a seven 
year period. The sample used in the econometric estimations only includes innovative firms 
in the manufacturing and service sectors. Furthermore, since 2010 PITEC provides the 
setup year so we may take into consideration the firm’s age. Hence, PITEC is the best 
database for observing the innovation activities of Spanish firms over time (Barge-Gil, 
2010). However, the primary data has two main drawbacks. First, ‘potential innovators’ 
might be underrepresented since CIS tends to have an overrepresentation of firms that 
carry out innovative activities. Second, our indicators for lack of finance have a qualitative 
dimension and are proxies of the existence of financial constraints. 
 
The procedure for filtering our sample is the following. First, we restrict our sample to 
firms with at least 6 or 7 observations, hence, those that appear in 2004 or 2005 and remain 
active until 2010. Second, we drop firms that have suffered a process of mergers. Third, to 
avoid problems with sample selection, we select firms that are potential innovators since 
they will perceive financial constraints more directly. Following Savignac (2008), D’Este et 
al. (2012) and Blanchard et al. (2012), we exclude firms that do not have the intention of 
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 innovating since they will not perceive any financial constraint in relation to R&D activities. 
Hence, we do not take into account firms that do not innovate and do not declare that they 
face financial barriers.  
 
After empirical treatment, our sample contains 4,882 firms, of which 3,779 firms belong to 
the manufacturing sector and 1,043 firms to the service sector. 
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
 
We consider two groups of dependent variables. The first group captures whether potential 
innovative firms perceive financial constraints. FCinternal captures the lack of funds within 
a firm or group; FCexternal captures the lack of funds from sources outside a firm, and FC 
captures the lack of funds regardless of the source. These three dummy variables are equal 
to 1 in the case that the firm states it perceives a high level of financial constraint and nil 
when the degree is medium, low or null. 
 
The second group captures whether a firm abandons an innovation project. AB_conc_proj 
indicates those firms that abandon a project, while AB_conc and AB_proc indicate when the 
project is abandoned: during the initial period (AB_conc) or once the innovation project had 
started (AB_proj)6.  
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables are the following. Age measures the firm’s age (in natural logs) as 
the difference between the period of observation and the year of creation. Size measures 
the number of employees in the firm (in natural logs). RD is a dummy variable that 
captures whether the firm invests in R&D or 0 otherwise. Group is a dummy variable that 
takes a value equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a group. FCpersist is a dummy variable with a 
value equal to 1 in the case that the firm indicates high financial barriers during six or more 
periods. Know and Market are dummy variables that indicate whether the firm perceives a 
medium or high level of barriers related to knowledge or market factors. Coop is a dummy 
variable controlling whether a firm cooperates with other agents. InternatMarket takes a 
value equal to 1 in the case that the firm participates in international markets. RDintensity is 
the R&D investment per employee in thousands of euros (in natural logs). Finally, we also 
include industry and time dummies to control possible differences in the probability of 
abandoning a project and of suffering financial constraints across sectors and over time. 
 
4.4. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of observations according to whether firms abandon a 
project or not and according to whether they perceive financial constraints. We observe 
                                                 
6 Spanish CIS questionnaire considers other alternatives related to the seriously delay of the innovation 
project, but it only appeared in 2004. 
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 that 23% of potential innovative firms state that they abandon an innovation project during 
the concept and/or project stage. First, we must highlight that the percentage of firms 
perceiving financial constraints is larger among the group of firms that abandon an 
innovation project than those that do not abandon one. Second, differences appear when 
distinguishing according to the stage: 61.64% of firms that abandon the project once the 
project has started state they do not perceive any financial constraint, while this percentage 
diminishes to 52.34% for firms that abandon the project during the concept stage. Third, 
when comparing firms that abandon during the concept and project stage, the percentage 
of firms abandoning during the project stage and that perceive external financial barriers is 
significantly lower than the percentage of firms that abandon during the concept stage. 
Hence, this preliminary descriptive would indicate a considerably larger incidence of 
financial barriers acting on the probability of abandoning a project, in particular during the 
concept stage.  
 
---- Insert Table 1 ---- 
 
Additionally, following Canepa and Stoneman (2008), for Pearson’s χ2 and the LR test 
statistics for hypotheses, we estimate that the rows and columns in the two-way tables are 
independent. That the rows and columns in the two-way tables are independent for 
Pearson’s χ2 and the LR test statistics for the hypotheses, suggests that there are differences 
in the percentage of firms perceiving financial constraints according to whether they 
abandon or not an innovation project.  
 
Table 2 provides the overall means of the main variables used in our econometric analysis 
and compares fours groups of firms: (i) firms that do not abandon a project; (ii) firms that 
abandon a project during any stage; (iii) firms that abandon a project during the concept 
stage; and (iv) firms that abandon a project once the project has started.  
 
---- Insert Table 2 ---- 
 
First, it is interesting to note that firms that abandon a project are, on average, older and 
larger than those than do not abandon a project. This clearly shows that older and larger 
firms have more capacity to start an innovation project and, of course, they are more likely 
to abandon it. RD and RDintensity are significantly higher for those firms that abandon a 
project. In particular, firms that abandon during the project stage demonstrate a higher 
average of R&D intensity. Third, a considerable percentage of firms perceive continuous 
financial constraints. For instance, the percentage of firms that do not abandon a project 
but perceive continuous financial barriers is equal to 18.20%, while this percentage 
increases up to 24.07% for firms that abandon during the concept stage. Fourth, a large 
percentage of firms state that they perceive some type of knowledge or market barriers. 
However, this percentage increases up to more than 90% for firms that abandon a project. 
Finally, significant differences appear when considering the proportion of firms belonging 
to a group, cooperating with other firms and competing in international markets. In these 
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 categories, there are a larger proportion of firms that abandon a project than those that do 
not abandon.   
 
---- Insert Table 3 ---- 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between our explanatory variables. All the correlations show 
a high level of significance. However, the correlations are far from perfect. The main 
exception is the correlation between the R&D intensity and the R&D dummy variable 
(with a correlation equal to 0.7078), between FC and FCpersist (with a correlation equal to 
0.5768) and between the barriers related to knowledge and market factors (with a 
correlation equal to 0.5746).  
 
 
5. Econometric methodology  
 
Our aim is to examine the determinants of Spanish firms abandoning innovation projects 
between 2004 and 2010. In line with previous scholars (Savignac, 2008; Blanchard et al., 
2012), we consider that financial obstacles affect the probability of deterring innovation 
projects. In others words, financial constraints significantly affect the likelihood that firms 
abandon innovative activities. We employ a bivariate probit model to estimate this. The 
first equation measures the probability that a potentially innovative firm perceives financial 
constraints. We will consider three different equations of financial constraints:  
FCit* = mit’δ1 + u11it    (1) 
FCinternalit* = mit’δ2 + u12it   (2) 
FCexternalit* = mit’δ3 + u13it    (3) 
 
FC*, FCinternal* and FCexternal* are dummy variables which indicate that a firm perceives 
financial constraints, internal financial constraints and external financial constraints. δ  
corresponds to the vector of parameters to be estimated and u is the error term. In line 
with Blanchard et al. (2012), equations (1) – (3) depend on the following set of explanatory 
variables (mit’): 
1. Firm size: we consider that large firms are in a better position to overcome 
financial obstacles. We expect that large firms face fewer obstacles than small 
firms. 
2. Firm age: we consider young firms will suffer more financial constraints. 
3. R&D: firms investing in R&D will often perceive more financial obstacles.  
4. Group: we consider a firm belonging to a corporate group will overcome 
financial barriers more easily in comparison to an independent firm. 
5. Sectoral dummies: we consider that firms in some sectors may suffer higher 
financial constraints due to higher sunk costs or competitiveness levels.  
6. Time dummies: during expansion there are better facilities to gain access to 
financial resources, while during a crisis financial resources decrease.  
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 The second equation is the probability that a firm abandons an innovation project. We 
consider three dependent variables: i) a dummy variable when a firm abandons a project, 
regardless of the stage (AB_conc_proj); ii) a dummy variable which takes a value equal to 1 
when the firm abandons a project during the concept stage (AB_conc); iii) and a dummy 
variable which takes a value equal to 1 when the project is abandoned once the project has 
started (AB_ proj). Since equations (1) to (3) will be introduced with respect to those 3 
variables, we will obtain the following equations:  
 
AB_conc_projit = FCit*γ21 + xit’φ21 + u21,it     (4) 
AB_conc_projit = FCinternalit*γ 22+ xit’φ22 + u22,it     (5) 
AB_conc_projit = FCexternalit*γ 23+ xit’φ23 + u23,it    (6) 
 
AB_concit  = FCit*γ 31+ xit’φ31 + u31,it      (7) 
AB_concit  = FCinternalit*γ32 + xit’φ32 + u32,it     (8) 
AB_concit  = FCexternalit*γ33 + xit’φ33+ u33,it      (9) 
 
AB_projit  = FCit*γ41 + xit’φ 41+ u41,it    (10) 
AB_projit  = FCinternalit*γ42 + xit’φ42 + u42,it   (11) 
AB_projit  = FCexternalit*γ 43+ xit’φ43 + u43,it   (12) 
 
Where γ and φ correspond to the vectors of parameters to be estimated and u is the error 
term. With respect to the explanatory variables introduced (x):  
1. Financial constraints (internal, external or both): we consider that they will increase 
the probability of abandoning an innovation project.  
2. Persistence of financial constraints: firms that perceive continuous financial 
constraints may suffer a higher probability of abandoning a project. However, this 
variable may identify firms that are innovating continuously.   
3. Knowledge and Market barriers: given previous literature, we also introduce both 
barriers since they may also cause a firm to abandon a project.  
4. Firm age: we consider that young firms will have less experience and they may 
abandon a project before its completion.  
5. Firm size: similarly, small firms may have more problems in continuing with 
innovation projects. However, large firms usually have a larger portfolio of 
innovations. Hence, large firms may state more often that they have abandoned a 
project.   
6. Cooperation: firms participating in a project through cooperation may be doing so 
because the projects are riskier. Consequently, this variable is expected to affect 
positively the probability of abandoning an innovation project.  
7. International markets: firms in international markets are engaged in more intense 
competition; hence, it is likely that they will carry out more innovation projects. 
8. R&D intensity: Firms with higher R&D intensity will be more probable to engage 
in riskier projects and, consequently, their probability of abandonment may be 
higher.   
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 9. Sectoral dummies: we consider that firms in some sectors may engage in riskier 
projects due to the nature of their activities. 
10. Time dummies: we include time dummies to control the effect of expansions and 
crisis on the probability of abandoning innovation projects. 
 
Finally, we must mention three different points. First, CIS datasets present a potential 
endogeneity. Firms may be more likely to indicate ‘some’ lack of finance the more 
innovation projects they conduct and thus the amount they invest in R&D. To solve this 
situation, the estimation methods usually use instrumental variables (Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott 2009). According to Savignac (2008), the probability of deterring innovative 
activities and the presence of financial restrictions must be estimated simultaneously, since 
there is a strong endogeneity between innovative activities and financial constraints. In 
others words, financial constraints significantly reduce the likelihood that firms carry out 
innovative activities and, in counterpart, innovative firms enjoy a higher probability of 
generating ex-ante internal resources in order to reduce financial restrictions in investment 
decisions. In that sense, the bivariate probit model takes the correlations between the 
likelihood of failure of an innovation project and the facing of financial barriers into 
account. These correlations may arise if there are factors omitted or unobservable that 
simultaneously affect both aspects (Savignac, 2008). The bivariate probit estimation, where 
we assume normality of the error terms, provides a correlation parameter that yields 
information about the co-variation of the error terms of the two estimations.   
 
Second, our sample consists of a panel data between 2004 and 2010. This characteristic led 
to control for the existence of persistence of financial constraints. Third, previous literature 
has mentioned the possibility that their results suffer a “survivorship bias” (Mohnen et al., 
2008; Landry et al., 2008), since they are not able to “control for firms that did not survive 
after the failure of an innovation project”. In that sense, our results may suffer the same 
bias since we have all those firms that survived until 2010. However, a few firms are 
excluded because we are not able to observe them. According with our data, 4% of firms 
are not observed at the end of the period. Hence, we consider that the impact of these 
firms on our estimations should not cause a significant bias.  
 
 
6. Results   
 
Table 4 presents the analysis of the effect of financial constraints and other control 
variables on the probability of abandoning a project.  
 
With respect to the determinants affecting the probability of suffering financial constraints, 
the main results are the following. First, the probability of perceiving financial restrictions 
declines with firm age and size. This is consistent with the theory that asymmetric 
information diminishes: when a firm gets older and larger its track records and collateral 
increase. Innovative new firms experience tough barriers for access to external resources, in 
particular small firms, while large and incumbent firms generate internal funds to finance 
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 such innovation activities. Evidence shows that smaller firms are more likely to face 
financing constraints, as they usually cannot provide as much overall collateral value 
compared to larger firms. For instance, Savignac (2008) finds that the probability of 
financing constraints decreases with firm size and depends on the firms' ex-ante financing 
structure. In addition, younger firms may be restricted in their R&D investment due to 
additional factors that affect financing conditions (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2009). 
Similar empirical evidence might be found in Canepa and Stoneman (2005), Schneider and 
Veugelers (2010), Blanchard et al. (2012) and Galia et al. (2012).  
 
Second, firms that invest in R&D are more likely to suffer financial constraints, in 
particular, external funds. This result is consistent with Blanchard et al. (2012) who assert 
that firms investing in R&D will be more likely to face obstacles. Finally, the fact that a 
firm belongs to a group of firms diminishes the probability of suffering financial 
constraints. In line with Tiwari et al. (2008) and Galia et al. (2012), this evidence indicates 
that firms belonging to a group may obtain financial support for their R&D activities more 
easily when they belong inside a group of firms. All the determinants are significant at 1%.  
 
With respect to the determinants affecting the probability of abandoning a project, our 
findings are the following. Table 4 presents the estimation of the determinants of 
abandoning an innovation project, secondly the probability of abandoning a project during 
the concept stage, and finally the probability of abandoning once the project has started. 
Each equation will consider our three types of financial constraints, FCinternal, FCexternal 
and FC (equations (4) to (12)).  
 
---- Insert Table 4 ---- 
 
First, in line with Mohnen et al. (2008) financial constraints in general increase the 
probability of abandoning a project. However, the distinction with the stage of 
abandonment seems important given that financial constraints are only significant to 
abandoning the project during the concept stage. One likely explanation may be related to 
the existence of the high sunk costs of R&D activities. Once a firm carries out R&D 
activities, other factors may be more important for abandoning a project. Finally, there 
seems that the effect of external financial restrictions is much more important on the 
probability of abandoning an R&D project.  
 
Second, with respect to the incidence of those firms perceiving persistent financial 
constraints, we observe that this variable is only significant on the probability of 
abandoning the project during the concept stage. This result may be explained by two 
different facts. On the one hand, the capacity to search for funds increases once the project 
starts. On the other hand, the high sunk costs related to R&D projects lead to financial 
constraints not being so important once the project starts and, as a consequence, the 
perception of financial constraints does not influence so intensely the decision to abandon 
an innovation project.  
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Third, other barriers related to knowledge and market increase the probability of 
abandoning a project. The results are significant regardless of the estimation. However, the 
incidence is higher for firms that state the abandonment of a project during the concept 
stage. This result may indicate the fact that the probability of abandonment not only 
depends on financial constraints but also on other barriers.  
 
Fourth, with respect to firm age we observe that the impact is not significant. This result 
may be due to the fact that young firms assume more risks through lack of experience, 
while older firms will have more experience but also a larger number of R&D projects. 
Hence, it is probable that firm age does not show a clear pattern.  
 
Fifth, we observe that firm size gives a positive indication on the probability of abandoning 
a project. Hence, older firms are more likely to abandon a project. According with Canepa 
and Stoneman (2008, p. 720) this “may reflect the fact that larger firms on average have 
higher levels of R&D spending and broader production programmes, and thus may have a 
greater likelihood of engaging in risky projects; as a result they may be more likely to 
terminate projects”. Hence, large firms may have a wider portfolio of R&D projects and, 
consequently, they will abandon innovation projects more frequently. 
 
With respect to the R&D cooperation, our results indicate a positive and significant impact 
on the likelihood of abandoning a project. However, when we consider the stage of the 
project it is only significant on the probability of abandoning during the concept stage. This 
result must be interpreted carefully since this variable may indicate that firms that start risky 
projects will cooperate more frequently. Evidence along this line can be found in Lhuillery 
and Pfister (2009). Those authors observe that firms which area collaborating are more 
likely to delay or stop an innovation project because of difficulties encountered in their 
R&D partnerships. Furthermore, their results show that firms collaborating with their 
suppliers also face a higher risk of cooperation failures. 
 
With reference to international competition, the coefficient shows a positive and significant 
impact on the probability of abandonment regardless of the stage of the project. The 
explanation of this result may be the fact that international competition obliges firms to be 
more competitive by investing in R&D projects. However, R&D projects diminish profit 
and cost margins and consequently dangerously increases the probability of abandoning 
projects.  
 
Finally, investment in R&D has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
abandoning a project. However, when distinguishing according to the stage, this impact is 
only significant when the abandonment happens during the concept stage. Our results may 
be related to the fact that those firms with higher capacity to invest in R&D activities may 
have more capacity to carry out new and different projects and, consequently, the 
probability that they will abandon any given project will also diminish.  
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Sectoral differences 
 
The next step is to distinguish between high-tech manufacturing industries, low-tech 
manufacturing industries, knowledge intensive services and non-knowledge intensive 
services. In that sense, our results show some interesting results (Table 5). 
 
First of all, financial constraints are not significant for high-tech manufacturing industries, 
while they continue to exert a significant and direct effect on the probability of abandoning 
a project during the concept stage for the rest of groups. According to Westhead and 
Storey (1997), Guiso (1998) and Canepa and Stoneman (2008), firms in the technological 
sectors will suffer higher financial constraints since by nature their projects are riskier. In 
fact, those authors note that firms in the high-tech sector are more likely to delay a project. 
A likely reason why our proxies of financial constraints are not significant is that firms in 
high-tech manufacturing industries suffer more financial constraints and, consequently, 
they fund a higher proportion of their innovation activity through internal financial 
sources. In this line, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found a large and significant 
relationship between R&D and internal finance for US small firms in high-tech industries. 
 
Second, our proxy indicating persistent financial constraints becomes non-significant for 
firms in high-tech manufacturing industries, while the impact for low-tech manufacturers is 
significant and positive at the concept stage. Surprisingly, the impact becomes negative for 
firms in the service sector. Two possible explanations arise from this evidence. First, 
persistent financial constraints are not so important for firms in the high-tech sector. This 
may be indicative of the capacity of these firms to overcome the persistent financial 
constraints. Second, firms in the service sectors that perceive persistent financial 
constraints may not be able to find the funds to invest and, consequently, they do not start 
an innovation project. 
 
---- Insert Table 5 ---- 
 
As we have seen previously, market barriers show a slightly lower impact on the probability 
of abandonment compared to the knowledge barriers. However, the coefficient of market 
barriers is larger than the coefficient of knowledge barriers for firms involved in high-tech 
manufacturing industries. A possible explanation may be the fact that firms in high-tech 
manufacturing industries are more sensitive to the potential of reaping profits from the 
market when they introduce an innovation. In that sense, Guiso (1998, p. 48) asserts that 
high-tech firms are more uncertain about the demand for their products.   
 
The non-significant impact of firm age for the whole database shows the heterogeneous 
performance at a sectoral level. In that sense, firm age increases the likelihood of 
abandoning a project for firms in high-tech manufacturing industries, while the coefficient 
becomes negative for service industries. 
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 For non-knowledge intensive services, the variable of cooperation and internationalisation 
does not exert a significant impact.  
 
Finally, for knowledge intensive services, the impact of R&D investment indicates a 
different impact on the probability of abandonment depending on the stage of the project. 
While firms with larger investment in R&D per employee show a larger probability to 
abandon a project during the concept stage, this probability becomes negative when 
considering the probability of abandonment during the project stage.  
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of financial barriers on the failure of 
innovation projects. Although the conceptualisation of failures of innovation projects has 
received less attention in literature and the specific evidence on their determinants is scarce, 
empirical findings tend to point out that facing financial barriers increases the likelihood of 
failure of innovation projects (Mohnen et al., 2008). Our interest is to contribute to the 
existing literature by analysing the different effect of internal and external financial barriers 
on the probability of abandonment during the initial stage of concept and during its 
development. 
 
The sensitivity of our proxies of financial constraints on the probability of abandonment 
indicates the necessity to increase the mechanisms that define firms in order to diminish 
information asymmetries. The existence of higher financial constraints in innovating firms 
justifies government intervention (Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). Governments should 
create new mechanisms to promote the access to external funds for R&D projects. We 
must take into account that banks usually do not have tools to properly measure the risk of 
innovation projects. However, other variables explain the probability of abandoning a 
project. Thus, not only money matters in order to abandon a project.  
 
Our results may complement previous literature since we are disentangling whether 
different sources of funds may exert a significantly increased probability of abandoning a 
project taking into consideration the stage of the project. 
 
We must mention two different drawbacks. First, our proxies for barriers are of subjective 
nature, being based on the personal appreciation of the respondents. However, we consider 
a firm suffering from barriers when the respondent states a medium-high level barrier. 
Second, we ignore the amount of projects that are abandoned. Hence, a firm that abandons 
one innovation project is considered identical to a firm that abandons three different 
projects. However, variables such as belonging to a group of firms, firm size and firm age 
may capture a firm’s capacity to carry on innovation projects. 
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Table 1.  
Number of observations. Distribution of observations according with the FC and whether they abandon or 
not a project. 2004-2010. 
Firms that… 
Number of 
observations
Financial constraints (%) 
Internal External
Internal and 
external 
No financial 
constraints 
Do not abandon 25,202 8.88 7.95 19.15 64.03 
Abandon only during the concept stage 2,757 10.92 11.50 25.24 52.34 
Abandon only during the project stage  1,984 10.23 7.76 20.36 61.64 
Abandon during concept & project 2,934 11.04 9.95 22.29 56.71 
Pearson χ2 = 196.7        Pr = 0.000 
LR χ2 = 192.08       Pr = 0.000 
Source: PITEC database.
 
Table 2.  
Statistical descriptive. Mean and Standard deviations between brackets. 2004-2010 
 Potential innovators
that do not 
abandon a 
project 
that abandon a 
project during 
any phase 
that abandon a 
project during the 
phase of concept 
that abandon a 
project during the 
phase of project 
Age (ln) 3.02 
(0.75) 
3.06
(0.76) 
3.07
(0.76) 
3.09 
(0.76) 
Size (ln) 4.19 
(1.29) 
4.34
(1.28) 
4.40
(1.29) 
4.36 
(1.28) 
RD  0.63 0.81 0.89 0.78 
RDintensity -3.81 
(7.93) 
-1.29
(6.40) 
0.23
(4.55) 
1.84 
(6.84) 
FCpersist 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.21 
Know 0.82 0.92 0.94 0.91 
Market 0.81 0.91 0.94 0.91 
Group 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.43 
Coop  0.27 0.44 0.47 0.43 
InternatMarket 0.69 0.81 0.83 0.81 
Observations 25,202 7,675 5,691 4,918 
Source: PITEC database.
 
Table 3.  
Spearman’s rank correlation.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) AB_conc_proj 1.000            
(2) FC 0.066* 1.000           
(3) Age 0.026* -0.110* 1.000          
(4) Size 0.052* -0.182* 0.318* 1.000         
(5) RD  0.157* 0.058* -0.004 0.061* 1.000        
(6) Group 0.060* -0.129* 0.093* 0.480* 0.066* 1.000       
(7) FCpersist 0.048* 0.577* -0.092* -0.138* 0.095* -0.099* 1.000      
(8) Know 0.116* 0.220* -0.014* -0.042* 0.237* -0.022* 0.146* 1.000     
(9) Market 0.120* 0.188* -0.006 -0.064* 0.218* -0.020* 0.129* 0.575* 1.000    
(10) Coop  0.154* 0.029* 0.002 0.128* 0.303* 0.148* 0.044* 0.133* 0.113* 1.000   
(11) InternatlMarket 0.116* 0.002 0.176* 0.124* 0.252* 0.117* 0.017* 0.125* 0.142* 0.110* 1.000  
(12) RDintensity 0.131* 0.076* -0.093* -0.080* 0.708* 0.052* 0.114* 0.194* 0.192* 0.338* 0.197* 1.000 
* signficant at 5%. 
Source: PITEC database. 
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 Table 4.  
Recursive bivariate probit of the probability of abandoning a project and the probability to suffer financial 
constraints. Whole database. 
 Probability to suffer financial constraints 
 FC FCinternal FCexternal FC FCinternal FCexternal FC FCinternal FCexternal
Age -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.0909*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.0909*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.0911***
 (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Size -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.122*** -0.118*** -0.106*** -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
RD 0.202*** 0.111*** 0.235*** 0.208*** 0.118*** 0.237*** 0.198*** 0.111*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0190) (0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0179) 
Group -0.194*** -0.226*** -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.223*** -0.192*** -0.198*** -0.227*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0190) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
Constant 0.678*** 0.546*** 0.309*** 0.678*** 0.546*** 0.309*** 0.677*** 0.545*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0554) (0.0557) (0.0534) (0.0554) (0.0557) (0.0534) (0.0554) (0.0557) 
  
Probability to abandon a project 
 Regardless the stage During the concept Once the project has started 
FC 0.350**   0.581***   0.109   
 (0.175)   (0.129)   (0.199)   
FC_internal  -0.0240   0.245*   -0.185  
  (0.180)   (0.145)   (0.205)  
FC_external   0.362**   0.464***   0.182 
   (0.141)   (0.106)   (0.173) 
FCpersist -0.0091 0.0272 0.0352 -0.0034 0.0436* 0.0447* -0.0159 -0.0059 0.0188 
 (0.0239) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0254) (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0267) (0.0251) (0.0250) 
Know 0.220*** 0.229*** 0.230*** 0.298*** 0.313*** 0.310*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0353) (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0327) (0.0325) (0.0326) 
Market 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.291*** 0.300*** 0.299*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0318) 
Age 0.0011 -0.0111 -0.0012 0.0033 -0.0084 -0.0042 0.0139 0.0043 0.0151 
 (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0138) 
Size 0.0794*** 0.0602*** 0.0773*** 0.112*** 0.0951*** 0.102*** 0.0651*** 0.0492*** 0.0681***
 (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.00892) (0.00967) (0.0103) (0.00857) (0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0105) 
Coop  0.306*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.246*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.257*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0196) 
InternatMarket 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) 
RDintensity 0.0090*** 0.0101*** 0.0086*** 0.0362*** 0.0381*** 0.0364*** -3.60e-05 0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.00137) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Constant -2.232*** -1.959*** -2.205*** -2.700*** -2.470*** -2.576*** -2.351*** -2.119*** -2.397*** 
 (0.143) (0.153) (0.103) (0.113) (0.125) (0.0978) (0.176) (0.191) (0.126) 
Rho -0.125 0.0848 -0.159* -0.256*** -0.0701 -0.205*** -0.0165 0.165 -0.0870 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.0849) (0.0830) (0.0858) (0.0634) (0.121) (0.128) (0.102) 
χ2 4098.68 3862.39 3750.08 4638.01 4197.83 4153.60 3277.41 3174.92 2917.66 
Prob (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 32,642 
Estimations control for time and sector dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 5.  
Recursive bivariate probit of the probability of abandoning a project and the probability to suffer financial constraints. Classification according with the technological intensity..
 Probability to suffer financial constraints
High-tech manufactures Low-tech manufactures KIS services Non-KIS services 
Abandon concept Abandon project Abandon concept Abandon project Abandon concept Abandon project Abandon concept Abandon project 
FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal FCinternal FCexternal 
Age -0.113*** -0.0720*** -0.113*** -0.0726*** -0.111*** -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.103*** -0.0605* -0.0798** -0.0591 -0.0798** -0.131*** -0.0934** -0.127*** -0.0911** 
 (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0361) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0368) (0.0386) (0.0376) (0.0389) 
Size -0.101*** -0.0990*** -0.101*** -0.0979*** -0.170*** -0.117*** -0.168*** -0.115*** -0.0817*** -0.100*** -0.0844*** -0.101*** -0.0494** -0.0820*** -0.0468** -0.0817*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0201) 
RD 0.0469 0.179*** 0.0483 0.174*** 0.143*** 0.218*** 0.132*** 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.355*** 0.171*** 0.354*** 0.295*** 0.456*** 0.270*** 0.447*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0331) (0.0319) (0.0325) (0.0264) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0257) (0.0522) (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0542) (0.0569) (0.0563) (0.0656) (0.0572) 
Group -0.218*** -0.206*** -0.218*** -0.208*** -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.199*** -0.204*** -0.229*** -0.111** -0.225*** -0.109** -0.236*** -0.159*** -0.256*** -0.160** 
 (0.0312) (0.0318) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0506) (0.0541) (0.0501) (0.0510) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0630) (0.0648) 
Constant 0.861*** 0.833*** 0.866*** 0.832*** 0.789*** 0.629*** 0.788*** 0.633*** 0.266** 0.229* 0.275** 0.233* 0.247* 0.0929 0.242 0.0852 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.148) (0.0926) (0.0914) (0.0928) (0.0913) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.149) (0.152) (0.148) (0.151) 
 Probability to abandon a project
FC_internal -0.0543 -0.254  0.472** -0.0255 0.555*** -0.348 1.304*** -0.197  
 (0.365) (0.352)  (0.223) (0.258) (0.192) (0.598) (0.396) (0.658)  
FC_external  0.297  0.0984 0.731*** 0.223  0.418 -0.0675 1.228***  0.662 
  (0.246)  (0.378) (0.199) (0.235)  (0.301) (0.573) (0.358)  (0.455) 
FCpersist -0.00525 0.0422 -0.0128 0.0319 0.192*** 0.151*** 0.00843 0.0165 -0.120* -0.141** -0.0301 0.0076 -0.313** -0.218 -0.0452 -0.0537 
 (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0385) (0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0370) (0.0409) (0.0394) (0.0616) (0.0625) (0.0627) (0.0642) (0.128) (0.133) (0.138) (0.137) 
Know 0.304*** 0.309*** 0.174*** 0.184*** 0.354*** 0.341*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.257** 0.260** 0.0788 0.0920 0.232* 0.274** 0.201* 0.213* 
 (0.0539) (0.0534) (0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0575) (0.0570) (0.0502) (0.0500) (0.110) (0.110) (0.0984) (0.101) (0.130) (0.130) (0.120) (0.119) 
Market 0.372*** 0.374*** 0.341*** 0.348*** 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.0893* 0.0901* 0.173* 0.197* 0.0866 0.108 0.317*** 0.294*** 0.266** 0.262** 
 (0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0541) (0.0543) (0.0526) (0.0521) (0.0474) (0.0473) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0947) (0.0972) (0.109) (0.109) (0.107) (0.106) 
Age 0.0234 0.0314 0.0573** 0.0694*** 0.0025 0.0077 0.0093 0.0164 -0.0915** -0.0869** -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.104** -0.109** -0.0870 -0.0686 
 (0.0241) (0.0212) (0.0253) (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0404) (0.0414) (0.0416) (0.0434) (0.0492) (0.0483) (0.0530) (0.0485) 
Size 0.0636*** 0.0814*** 0.0274 0.0472** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.0871*** 0.0987*** 0.103*** 0.0964*** 0.0660 0.0837** 0.0413 0.0523* -0.0255 -0.0037 
 (0.0224) (0.0158) (0.0228) (0.0208) (0.0163) (0.0134) (0.0202) (0.0151) (0.0223) (0.0242) (0.0416) (0.0338) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0317) (0.0296) 
Coop  0.174*** 0.177*** 0.185*** 0.191*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.498*** 0.501*** 0.322*** 0.330*** 0.107 0.102 0.260*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0288) (0.0311) (0.0304) (0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0523) (0.0526) (0.0600) (0.0560) (0.0839) (0.0837) (0.0921) (0.0934) 
InternatMarket 0.0931** 0.0894** 0.0365 0.0345 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.154*** 0.130 0.115 0.197** 0.182** 
 (0.0444) (0.0441) (0.0431) (0.0435) (0.0382) (0.0377) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0498) (0.0502) (0.0524) (0.0526) (0.0862) (0.0878) (0.0909) (0.0906) 
RDintensity 0.0404*** 0.0388*** -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0393*** 0.0377*** 0.0021 0.0013 0.0144*** 0.0137*** -0.0106** -0.0117** 0.0380*** 0.0351*** 0.0024 -0.00165 
 (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
Constant -2.469*** -2.786*** -2.249*** -2.609*** -2.782*** -2.895*** -2.178*** -2.355*** -1.868*** -1.821*** -1.071** -1.335*** -1.993*** -2.004*** -1.684*** -2.128*** 
 (0.415) (0.307) (0.435) (0.386) (0.181) (0.160) (0.239) (0.190) (0.192) (0.246) (0.529) (0.446) (0.249) (0.245) (0.496) (0.258) 
Rho 0.0940 -0.173 0.214 -0.0548 -0.232* -0.339*** 0.0390 -0.116 -0.167 -0.0768 0.363 0.115 -0.548** -0.577** 0.203 -0.304 
 (0.222) (0.149) (0.225) (0.226) (0.134) (0.126) (0.153) (0.137) (0.118) (0.183) (0.418) (0.357) (0.256) (0.226) (0.398) (0.251) χ2 1123.60 1086.07 939.45 837.96 1892.44 1689.10 1321.55 1040.91 439.72 465.16 238.44 245.15 497.09 494.88 366.00 371.64 
Prob (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 11,557 14,040 4,017 3,028
Estimations control for time and sector dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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